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ABSTRACT
Prior research has focused on the transactional aspects of the Hawala Networks (i.e. Invisible 
Funds Transfer Networks). However, little is known about the structure of this networked 
"organisation" especially about its governance and management control systems. Clan-
based Organisations and Actor Network Theories were utilised to provide the theoretical 
base on which a research farmework was built. In total, 20 indepth interviews were conducted 
with Hawaldars (Hawala service providers) using a semi-structured questionnaire. As the 
study focused on the Gulf Cooperation Council region, data were collected from Qatar, UAE 
and Kuwait. The data indicated that there were no formal governance and management 
control systems in place for managing Hawala Networks (HNets); there were no explicit 
formal processes and mechanisms for evaluating performance and there was no formal 
performance measurement and tracking system in place to provide the information about 
network functionality. Results also showed that trust acted as the most important control 
mechanism impacting the efficiency, effectiveness and the relatively lower transaction 
costs associated with HNets operations.
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INTRODUCTION
Health Network for Evaluation and Training Systems (HNets) is a worldwide 
informal funds transfer phenomenon commonly used by expatriates wanting to 
send money home, businesses in import/export, for foreign exchange transactions 
and for travel. It is estimated that every year over USD500 billion flows through 
HNets (Thompson, 2011). HNets exist due to a number of reasons which include; 
anonymity, cultural friendliness (Chene, 2008), low transaction costs (Maimbo, 
2003), less transit time (Schramm & Taube, 2002), enhanced level of trust 
(Schramm & Taube, 2002) and increased efficiency (Ballard, 2003).
Research Background
Very limited (if any) research has been conducted to specifically look at the 
governance mechanisms and management control systems in HNets. A review of 
the existing research in the area of HNets reveals that most of the research has 
focused on defining what HNets do and describing the general mechanics of how 
money is transferred through the system (e.g., Ballard, 2003; El-Qorchi, Maimbo, 
& Wilson, 2003; Maimbo, 2003; Passas, 1999; 2006; Schramm & Taube, 2002; 
Wilson, 2002). The current research on Hawala provides basic information on 
how the network operates and how the linkages among network members function 
(Ballard, 2005a); but leaves a number of important questions unanswered such 
as how these informal networks are governed, coordinated or how controls are 
established and exercised. Unlike "formal" transnational economic activities 
that operate from relatively static identifiable entities (such as banks and other 
multinational corporations) and which are regulated by national and international 
governmental institutions, the Hawala economy is constituted by networks of 
spatially dispersed heterogeneous actors with no specific centre. While one might 
think that as an enterprise that exists in the "grey" area of legality, the default rate 
and default risk would be high, fraud would be rife, and exploitation a common 
occurence, there is a surprising consensus among scholars that the HNets have 
a history of being reliable, speedy and convenient (Ballard, 2005a; Schramm & 
Taube, 2003).
HNets in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Region
HNets are thriving in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region due to low 
transaction costs and simple transfer procedures (Pathak, 2003). Furthermore, 
HNets reach parts of the world (such as rural areas) where formal institutions such 
as banks do not exist. Appropriately, they are labeled "poor man's bank". These 
networks provide a useful service to low income workers from the Indian sub-
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continent in the GCC region for sending their money to remote areas. Furthermore, 
majority of the Indian sub-continent (to include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Nepal) based Hawala deals are being currently initiated and managed in the GCC 
region. The key reasons for this "situation" are large population of workers from 
the sub-continent, their inability to use formal monetary transfer system, and the 
proximity of GCC to the sub-continent region (Ballard, 2005b). Other supporting 
factor for thriving Hawala network in the GCC region are to do with local currency 
peg to the dollar and the unrestricted access to global financial system. HNets are 
flourishing in the GCC region (including Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia) and play a crucial role in billions of dollars of money transfers out of 
GCC. In fact, Dubai is labelled as a part of the "Hawala Triangle" where India and 
Pakistan represent other vertices (Pathak, 2003). 
The GCC region is fast developing and expanding its financial sector. In 
particular, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are striving hard to become financial 
centres of the Middle East. With these ambitions in progress, any monetary 
leakages or financial irregularities related to the utilisation of the informal channels 
of money tranfer can (and do) disrupt these plans. Hence, governments in the 
GCC region are seriously interested in curbing the use of Hawala. To start with, 
the profits related to the formal remittance system are being eroded as a result of 
HNets provding an alternative and a cheaper money transfer option (Passas, 1999). 
The financial divergance through HNets also results in taxation losses for the 
government as money is moving outside the formal financial channels and remains 
untaxed (El-Qorchi, 2002). Another problem associted with the money moving 
out of the formal financial channels is its undetecable usage. There have been 
cases (even though quite rare) where illegal businesses and criminal activity have 
been known to be funded through Hawala transfers (Passas, 1999). The minimal 
transaction record with no legal coverage has resulted in fraud (very few cases) 
due to the untraceable nature of the Hawala tranfers (Schramm & Taube, 2002; 
Farooqi, 2010). Additionally, the speed of Hawala transaction completion (in most 
cases) is faster than fromal channel transfers. The typical Hawala transaction can 
take anywhere from hours to a day or two at the most. HNets also provide deeper 
transfer penetration as comapred to formal remittance system. HNets have been 
known to reach remote and rural areas where conventional fianncial institutions do 
not exist. The formal transfers (mostly through banks) take longer as the funds need 
to be converted into foreign exchange depending on the termination country and 
the number of banks invloved in the transfer process. Hence, slow transfer through 
formal remitance channels also motivates the money sender towards HNets.
In the GCC region, despite of their negative and adverse effect on formal 
remittance system, HNets are a prominent exemplar of the informal systems used 
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for transferring money from GCC member countries to foreign locations (mostly 
the the Indian sub-continent). Even roots of HNets can be traced to this region 
and that is why they are also known as the 'Eastern Union' (as opposed to Western 
Union) to signify their origins. Usually HNets, found in the GCC region, operate 
outside mainstream banking channels which results in minimal transaction related 
documentation and paperwork. This 'informality' is also associated with the ability 
of HNets to provide the lowest transactions costs, cultural friendliness, lower 
delivery time, enhanced trust and increased efficiency. These positive service 
aspects favor 'working class' population in the GCC region who can have easy and 
inexpensive access to these informal channels to transfer their money (Hanieh, 
2010). HNets are credited with the ability to move billions of dollars annually 
involving thousands of discrete transactions. However, still little is known about 
how these networks are managed, controlled and governed. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The key issue addressed by this research is how HNets, despite being geographically 
dispersed, are highly proximate in creating mutually beneficial relationships. More 
specifically, the study examined the following key interrelated questions:
1. How do various actors enter into the HNet?
2. How do relationships (both vertical and horizontal) develop within the 
HNets?
3. What are the forces that bind the HNet actors to one another, including the 
role of trust?
4. What are the practicalities associated with managing the HNet multinational 
and crossnational relationships?
LITERATURE REVIEW
Conceptually the research is grounded in two streams of theory: (i) Ouchi (1980) 
framework for studying clan-based organizations; and (ii) actor network theory 
(ANT) (Latour, 1987) that focuses on the multiple associations, the elaborate 
translocal business linkages and sociocultural ties that make up socioeconomic 
networks.
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Actor-Network Theory 
(Theoretical Perspective II)
Clan Based Organisations 
(Theoretical Perspective I)
Network Management
• Information exchange
• Operations
• Organisational 
structure
• Complaint handling
• Complaint handling
Network Trust
• Reputation
• Reduced opportunism
• Social 
communication
Network Membership
• Social/Cultural 
values
• Religious/Ethnic 
values
• Membership terms
Network Relationships
• Time orientation
• Mutual objectives
• Scope of 
relationships
 Exchanges/Transactions
 Impact and Influence of theoretical perspectives
Figure 1. Research Framework
Theoretical Perspective I: Clan Based Organisations
Ouchi (1980, p. 140) defines an organisation as, "any stable pattern of transactions 
between individuals or aggregations of individuals". Ouchi (1980) used the 
transaction cost approach to look at intermediation forms and identified three basic 
mechanisms of mediation or control; markets, bureaucracies and clans. Ouchi 
suggested that the normative requirements for clan-based organizations in the 20th 
century were reciprocity, legitimate authority and common values and beliefs. 
Ouchi posited that the norm of reciprocity underlies all exchange mechanisms and 
has been found to be universal among all societies across time (Gouldner, 1961). 
In its absence the cost of the exchange, involving contractual terms, auditing 
and performance evaluation tasks, would make the transaction prohibitively 
expensive and not worthwhile. Legitimate authority can take the rational/legal 
form in the case of a bureaucracy while it can take the traditional form in clan 
based organisations. Common values and beliefs in the clan form eliminate the 
possibility of  opportunistic behaviour among clan members as cheating another 
member would be like cheating oneself. A value system that is mutually acceptable 
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to the Hawala service provider and the service user is fundamental in sustaining 
the system. HNets are largely driven by the code of honor, reputation (of the 
Hawaldar), trust and personal relationships connecting HNet members and Hawala 
service users (White, 2003). According to Tilly (2005), a combination of honor, 
reputation and personal relationships results in 'noble value'. Within the HNets 
clan, noble value creates a belief of trust and individuals (both service providers 
and service users) engage in transactions with reduced fear of opportunism (Tilly, 
2005).
Theoretical Perspective II: Actor Network Theory (ANT)
Actor Network Theory (ANT) has been used to look at a variety of accounting 
phenomenon involving complex relationships (Briers & Chua, 2001; Chua, 1995; 
Gendron & Barrett, 2004; Miller, 1991; Preston, Cooper, & Coombs, 1992; Robson, 
1992) such as "interfirm alliances" as well as to study the social implications of 
relationships (Callon, Law, & Rip, 1986). Recently, ANT has been applied to the 
study of how economic markets are organised (Caliskan & Callon, 2009; Callon, 
1991; 1998). Callon (1991; 1998) argued that economic markets are networks 
and to understand how market transactions are governed and stabilised; we need 
to examine the "processes of economizing" that takes place within the economic 
markets. The processes of economizing refers to "the processes that constitute 
the behaviours, organizations, institutions and, more generally, the objects in a 
particular society which are tentatively and often controversially qualified, by 
scholars as 'economic'" (Caliskan & Callon 2009, p. 370). Given that HNets are 
engaged in transnational economic activities, the proposed research draws on the 
ANT to investigate the "processes of economising" that leads to their effectiveness 
in transfering funds around the globe.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Through the multiple informants at multiple levels in the HNets a variety of 
network members were interviewed to gain a better appreciation of how these 
networks were governed and what management control systems were employed in 
governing a multinational "organisation" that was indeed a true network or a clan 
organisation.
Data collection was done using interview based field research which 
allowed for the understanding of phenomenon in their natural setting (Patton, 
1990; Yin, 1989). This methodology gave researchers an opportunity to follow 
the relevant actors to develop an understanding of the management activities and 
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actions within the HNets (Callon, 1991; Latour, 1996). The study involved using 
various sources of information including Hawaladars at different levels, formal 
value transfer operators and HNet experts. Using multiple information sources 
enabled the maintenance of the "critical distance" necessary as defined by Law 
(1991). Gathering data from the multiple sources was consistent with the extant 
field studies in management research (for details see Ferreira and Merchant, 1992) 
and was also in consonance with Yin's (1989) commentary on improving the 
construct validity of field data.  
Interpretive methodology involving in-depth interviews was utilised to 
collect the data. Adopting this semi-structured interviewing approach provided 
an opportunity for investigating emergent and new issues that were not selected 
prior to the study but proved to be relevant. The semi-structured and flexible 
questionnaire format, especially in the early stages of the field work, reduced the 
number of predetermined questions (which may not have been a relevant question 
to ask) and hence this 'improvised' approach helped with the identification of fitting 
and appropriate questions. The flexibility generated through the semi-structured 
interviewing questionnaire created a room for further improvements (Arthur & 
Nazroo, 2003). Since, semi-structured research designs have been criticized as 
leading to diffuseness and data overload (Miles & Huberman, 1994), the looseness 
of the investigation was bounded by the semi-structured questionnaire which 
facilitated a focused approach to the research. In the interview process, care was 
taken not to evaluate the respondents' professional competence but to understand 
how they actually manage the networked environment in which they operate (Chua 
& Mahama, 2007). Where needed, appropriate language was used to facilitate the 
ease of communication between the respondent and the researcher. Research team 
was fluent in Arabic, English, Hindi, Punjabi and Urdu. These were the languages 
spoken and understood by most of the Hawala actors within the GCC region. 
To support data collection and maximise the number of contacts made, 
chain referral sampling was utilised. This sampling method was considered as 
the most appropriate for sample identification in networked individuals and firms 
(Sudman, 1976). Use of chain referral sampling tends to optimise the chances 
of reaching a wider part of the suitable and the appropriate sample through the 
contacts which have been already identified. As these contacts were familiar 
and knowledgeable about the HNet membership, their referrals resulted in an 
appropriate and a fitting respondent identification (Taylor, 1985). Another reason 
for adopting chain referral sampling was related to the semi-scattered nature of 
HNet members where Hawaladars were temporally and spatially displaced. 
Through chain referral sampling it was possible to make connections with HNet 
actors through other HNet actors.
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As described in the literature (Browne, 2005), chain referral sampling 
starts with a contact list (see Tables 1 and 2) containing individuals who are not 
only willing to furnish the required information but willing and comfortable in 
pointing out and even arranging meetings with suitable HNet members. Hence, to 
optimise the chances of reaching a suitable and an appropriate sample set, existing 
and newly developed connections were used from the academic and Hawala 
community. In particular, individuals (especially Hawaladars who are or have 
been a part of the HNet or service users who have been sending money through 
HNet) having an experience of and familiarity with HNet were approached with 
the referral requests (Taylor, 1985). 
While chain referral sampling is an effective and an efficient sampling 
strategy for research within organisations, it has a drawback of creating a narrowly 
defined sample which may not be a balanced representation of the population under 
investigation (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004). To overcome this limitation, a diverse 
location approach (i.e. sample to be dispersed over different geographic locations 
to include different parts of Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) was taken 
to maximise the geographical spread of the data. At different locations various 
leads (through various types of contacts to include respected community members, 
prominent Hawala network members, distinguished Hawala service users and 
local Hawala researchers and academics) were approached to create a large pool 
of contacts representing different segments of the population. Other inadequacies 
(such as interviewer bias, misunderstanding of context, language initiated 
problems and intentional mis-directions) commonly related to qualitative semi-
structured in-depth interviewing were minimised by complementing interviews 
with informal discussions. Cross referencing of formal (interviews) and informal 
(casual discussions) data helped with content clarification and reduction in error.
A trip was made to the Hawala zone (a place from where Hawaladars 
operate) prior to data collection to acquaint and familiarise with Hawala settings 
and rituals in order to understand the fundamental social mechanics surrounding 
Hawala business. The purpose of this pre data collection trip was to soak in Hawala 
social environment in order to feel comfortable within the HNet atmosphere when 
interviewing started.  
As HNets mostly operate within a restricted environment where access can 
be limited to a selective audience and Hawaladars tend to be secretive about their 
dealings, a recording device or note taking were not utilised during interviews. 
This caution was necessary to ensure that the respondents were comfortable and 
relaxed and there were minimal hesitations in sharing data and information. Even 
though mental note taking may have introduced certain errors into the research, 
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it was preferred that the respondents were fully engaged, unintimidated and open 
with their views and expressions. Team interviewing (with two researchers) was 
adopted to reduce the level of disinformation likely to result from the mental note 
taking. Cross referencing of collected data was done to minimise the amount of 
mistakes which could have been the outcome of memory lapse or inadequacy in 
remembering the respondent's answers and comments.
Table 1
A list of Hawala academics and professionals
Position Organisation Location Expertise
President A major mutual fund Karachi Investments, 
international money 
transfers, banking
Vice President Habib Bank Ltd. Dubai Banking, International 
Transactions
Owner A major foreign exchange 
dealer
Islamabad Money transfer, prior 
banking experience
Partner A major money transfer 
company
Karachi Money transfer, prior 
investment banking 
experience
Managing 
Director
Amana Investment Limited Colombo, Sri Lanka Informal transfers
Group Financial 
Controller
National Bank of Kuwait Kuwait International Finance
Vice President Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Abu Dhabi Corporate Finance
Deputy General 
Manager
Banque Sardar Beirut, Lebanon International Banking
Board Member Arab Finance Investment 
House
Beirut, Lebanon International 
Transactions
CEO Eastern Trust Dubai, UAE Islamic Investments
Head of Direct 
Investments
Al-Safat Investment 
Company
Kuwait Rural Business 
Development
General Manager Dhofar Investment 
Holding Company
Salalah, Oman Financial Advising
Currency Transfer 
Manager
Dubai Exchange Centre Dubai, UAE Foreign Transfers
Internal Auditor Ahalia Exchange Bureau Abu Dhabi, UAE Internal Financial 
Auditing
Financial 
Specialist
The World Bank Washington DC, 
USA
Developing Nations 
Financial Systems
(continued on next page)
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Position Organisation Location Expertise
Director Islamic 
Banking
State Bank of Pakistan Karachi, Pakistan Informal Financial 
Systems
Board Member Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey
Ankara, Turkey Hawala Networks
Professor Mustafa Kemal 
Universitesi
Ankara, Turkey Informal Finance
Professor Northeastern University Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA
International Finance
Researcher London School of 
Economics and Political 
Science
England, UK Developmental 
Economics
Special Advisor Financial Transactions and 
Reports Analysis Centre, 
Government of Canada
Toronto, Canada Informal Financial 
Institutions
Table 2
A list of Hawala actors (individuals who were connected to or were a part of a Hawala 
Network) 
Position Type of 
Business
Location Type of Actor
Bank 
Compliance 
Officer
Banker Dubai Banker, compliance issues, risk management issues, 
dealt with business people (using Hawala) and Hawala 
operators in pre-regulation period.
Insurance 
Officer
Insurance 
company
Dubai Involved in the Insurance business and the financial 
services sector, dealt with business people (using 
Hawala) and Hawala operators in pre-regulation period.
Hawaladar Hawala Dubai Previously involved in IVTS business in the pre-
regulation era.  Currently involved in international trade. 
Very familiar with all aspects of Hawala business, both 
as a user and a facilitator.
Senior Bank 
Officer
Banker Dubai Has dealt with Hawaladars extensively as well as 
business people in Pakistan and GCC who have used 
the Hawala route before the new regulatory environment 
came into place.
Bank 
Manager
Banker Abu 
Dhabi
Has dealt with Hawaladars extensively as well as 
business people in Pakistan and GCC who have used the 
Hawala route before the regulatory environment came 
into place.
(continued on next page)
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Position Type of 
Business
Location Type of Actor
Former banker 
who moved 
into remittance 
business
Hawala Abu 
Dhabi
Experienced banker who left position with an 
international bank and moved into the remittance 
business.  The company is a legally registered funds 
transfer business and has expanded significantly over the 
last nine years under his stewardship.  
VP Foreign 
Exchange
Banker Abu 
Dhabi
Experienced banker in the FX transaction area. 
Extensive contacts with business people as well as with 
various players in the money transfer business.
Managing 
Director
Money 
Transfer
Doha Experienced professional with over 30 years of 
experience in the Gulf financial sector) running a 
successful nationwide money exchange business in 
the Gulf region.  Extensive interaction with business 
community, financial institutions as well as the central 
banks of various Gulf countries.
Branch 
Manager
Banker Doha Experience banker with over three decades of experience 
in the gulf countries.  Currently managing one of the 
busiest branches of a local bank and dealing with all 
kinds of business and personal accounts.  Knowledge 
about formal and informal transactions and offered 
useful insights into the management of the network.
Commercial 
Manager
Banker Doha Currently working in the banking sector.  Experience in 
the private sector and with funds transfer business in the 
Gulf countries.  
Hawaladar Hawala Doha Retired Hawaladar.  Extensive experience in the Hawala 
business since 1968
Customer Customer 
Former
Doha Not directly involved in the business but has knowledge 
of people who were working in the area and were a part 
of the community.
Managing 
Director
Hawala 
Operator
Doha Businessman, born and raised in Doha.  Has been dealing 
with other businesses for over 30 years and has a fair bit 
of information on the Hawala practice.
Customer Former 
Customer
Doha Worked in Doha for over 30 years.  He was a client of the 
Hawala business before it became illegal in Qatar.  Since 
then has been using the banking channels.  Had contacts 
with people who used to run the business who have now 
left the country.
Customer Former 
Customer
Doha Lived in Doha for over a decade. Lived in Dubai before 
the move and is familiar with the Hawala business. 
Senior 
Banker
Banker Doha Veteran banker with over 20 years of experience working 
in Pakistan and Doha and dealing with Hawaladars, 
exchange houses, businessmen and high net worth 
individuals.
Table 2: (continued)
Khurram Sharif et al.
76
Data Analysis
The gathered data were maintained in NVivo and manual folders. NVivo was 
utilised for keyword/key phrase analysis. NVivo is a software package designed to 
organise qualitative data in a retrievable form. This software provides a database 
for the evidences gathered in the field through interviews and observational notes 
and memos. It helps the researcher to work efficiently with unstructured data such 
as interviews, documents, audio, video and pictures so as to enable better analysis 
and presentation. Maintaining such databases allow for a chain of evidence to be 
established such that external readers can follow the field report to the evidence 
upon which the report is based.
Preliminary interviews were conducted in Qatar, UAE and Kuwait with 
the view of identifying emergent themes relevant to the research. For pre-testing 
the questionnaire, three respondents who had experience and exposure in the area 
were interviewed. These interviews led to the revision of the final questionnaire. 
The three pre-test interviews were not included in the final data set. A total of 20 
in-depth interviews with Hawala actors were completed. The average time per 
interview was 105 minutes. The data were collected in two rounds conducted 
during summer 2013 and summer 2014.
Empirical Analysis
The HNets money transfer market is unregulated, yet there is evidence to suggest 
that they have been highly successful in money transfers at the lowest transaction 
cost with high level of efficiency (compared to the formal banking system). Mostly 
the Hawala transactions occur between people who could be described as total 
strangers, yet there is very limited evidence of fraud and conflict. More so, the 
HNets member initiating the transfer may have no direct personal or business 
contact with the other member who finally delivers the money to the receiver, yet 
the delivery is speedy and accurate. In fact, HNets have evolved into heterogeneous 
multinational "organisational networks", the operations of which are not yet well 
known and reported in the literature. Hence, the general research question was how 
are HNets governed, managed and controlled. Furthermore, the proposed research 
drew on Ouchi's framework for studying clan-based organizations and on Actor 
Network Theory's (ANT) notion of relational networks.
The analysis showed that there were no formal control mechanism 
underpinning the operations of HNets; there were no formal organisational 
structures and no legal contractual basis for conducting operations. Rather HNets 
were constituted as flat networks of heterogeneous participants who operated 
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through relational (social) contracting and with influence dispersed throughout the 
network. The data analysis indicated that trust acted as the most important control 
mechanism underpinning the efficiency, effectiveness and the relatively lower 
transaction cost of HNets operations. By operating through flat network structure, 
HNets have not only been able to reduce the cost of bureaucracy evident in the 
formal banking system but have also been able to effectively hold the network 
together through reliance on trust. In addition, the flatter network structure 
added to the speed with which decisions and delegations were made and lead to 
effective information sharing. At somepoint in the relationship, trust lead to open 
communication where confidential and sensitive information was shared between 
network actors with minimum of checks.
The data indicated that the operational aspects of the network were 
not uniform as they were not required to be so; neither was there a monitoring 
system in place which required the use of a standardised process for conducting 
business in the network. As such the operational aspects of the business varied 
from network to network and at times from person to person. The lower costs 
and service efficiencies could be related to the absence of third part monitoring or 
requirements to follow a prescribed or a standardised procedure for transferring 
funds. The lack of these compliance costs reduced the transaction costs. In 
addition, the speed with which transactions took place increased in the absence of 
bureaucratic processes found in the formal transfer systems. As a relevant analogy, 
HNets operated by finding connections similar to the World Wide Web which can 
find indirect pathways through connections via intermediary nodes (in the case of 
Hawala, trust based relationships). Hence, HNets are constituted as flat networks 
of heterogeneous participants who operate through relational (social) contracting 
and with a positive influence dispersed throughout the network. The following 
section presents a discussion about how trust emerges and becomes instantiated as 
an effective control mechanism in HNets.
Material Arrangements of HNets: Building and Consolidating the Network
Actor-network theorists suggest that rather than taking the material composition 
and arrangement of a network as given and then proceeding to analyse how 
the network is governed and controlled, one should start the investigation of 
governance and control by examining the patterning of such networks. That is, 
governance and controls are not add-ons to the network but constitute part of 
the processes of building and enacting the network. In this sense, the material 
composition and arrangement of a network may inhibit particular governance 
and control elements that both enable the network to be constituted and become 
stabilised during its operations. The study found evidence of control (informal in 
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nature) simultaneously emerging with the very composition and patterning of the 
networks in a process that can be described as "heterogeneous engineering" (Law, 
1991). It was heterogeneous engineering in the sense that it assembled a network 
of human actors (Hawaladars) and non-human elements (such as traditions, values 
and beliefs) from diverse and disparate origins into a network (HNets) that operated 
like a single actor (Hawala). It was within this heterogeneous engineering process 
that trust became the most effective control mechanism in the HNets that were 
studied. How trust was established as a control mechanism is explained next.
The composition of HNets was based on the careful screening for the 
trustworthiness of the potential network members. An individual's trustworthiness 
was established at two levels: (i) personal ties with existing Hawaladars and (ii) 
position within one's community. To become a part of a HNets, individual needed 
a long standing personal tie with one or more Hawaladars in the HNets who were 
willing and able to vouch for the joining member trustworthiness through a thorough 
system of referencing. References were essential ingredients in convincing existing 
HNets members that the new entrant was reliable and dependable and that he/she 
could be trusted to deliver when called upon to do so. Referees played an important 
role in case of any discrepancy, serious complaints or defaults. In such cases the 
referees were called upon to honor the commitments of the new entrant for whom 
reference was provided. It was usually over a considerable period of time involving 
numerous transactions that the supporting role of referees diminished. In the very 
rare cases of serious fraud, the Hawala Network took the collective responsibility 
of covering the losses of the service users. Especially, the reference providers or 
the guarantors (of the offender) take the lead in finding an amicable solution for 
recovering the losses and minimizing the reputational damage (Schramm & Taube, 
2002). This consolidatory behaviour exhibited by the Hawaladars is indicative of 
a desire to preserve collective reputation of the Hawala system (Humphrey & 
Schmitz, 1996). The offender, if caught, had to face the Hawala jury who then 
decide on the appropriate course of corrective action or punishment (Farooqi, 
2010). A point worth highlighted is that according to the interviewed respondents, 
and based on the key findings of this study, there were no reported acts of financial 
misconduct impressing the high level of trust and confidence that exists within 
HNets. However, a couple of Hawaladars talked about rare cases where a wakil 
(an adjudicator) was nominated through mutual consensus to resolve matters of 
financial misconduct (Thompson, 2011).
All interviewees in this study emphasised the importance of the reference 
system. For this reference system connected people to distant others whom they 
have never met and possibly will never meet but were willing to engage with them 
as a part of an extended network. For example, a number of the interviewees noted:
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They are connected through a system of reference.  A knows B 
and B knows C thus based on the common relationship to B, A and 
C would be able to transact business after an introduction by C. 
(Respondent 1)
The Hawaladars involved in the business are known to the local 
community as such it is easy to identify them. Once a new Hawaladar 
identifies a niche market that is not being serviced or has been 
able to identify a critical mass of customers that they can attract, 
they get connected to the known WH (Wholesale Hawaladar) in 
the region to facilitate their transactions. Personal introductions 
play a very important role in making these connections as it is 
only after getting a clean reference are the players in the Hawala 
Network willing to deal with the new person. Once one link is 
established and based on satisfactory dealings, the Hawaladar is 
able to leverage this connection to make other connections in the 
Network.
(Respondent 4)
In cases where trust references were not highly reliable and dependable, 
the fostering of trust occurred in a stepwise fashion where trust growth took 
time and transactions progressed from lower to a higher financial value. Hence, 
trust and reputation gaps were filled with risk-aversion approaches based on the 
incremental and careful induction of the (uncertified) new Hawaladar into the 
HNet. As an additional precautionary measure, Hawaladars (mostly new) facing 
trust deficit were also subjected to "upfront monetary deposits" and "capped 
financial transactions" over a period of time (involving numerous exchanges). As 
stated by a respondent:
Someone initially starting out and not well known to the WH 
(Wholesale Hawaladar) may need to put a deposit before getting 
started in the business. This allows them (i.e. new Hawaladars) to 
conduct the business up to the value of the deposit. 
(Respondent 13)
With successful transactions the "worth to transact" was increased. It 
was highly unlikely that the new and untested Hawaladar would suddenly jump 
from low to a high value transaction overnight. Moreover established members 
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of the network would not conduct large transactions with the new entrant before 
his/her credibility, in terms of the efficient execution of transactions and the 
financial ability to conduct large sum transactions was well established. This 
mechanism of risk management was a common practice within HNets. Due to 
the well-connected and tightly knit nature of the HNets, incidences of fraud and 
dishonesty were instantaneously communicated throughout the network to warn 
other members. This connectedness of HNets resulted in a rapid transfer and 
spread of information which played a pivotal role in creating awareness about any 
significant event (especially unpleasant) within the network.
Mutual dependency (i.e. A depends on B and B depends on C and 
A depends on C) would be weakened within the HNets if there were no safety 
nets and support structures for troubled network members. For instance, where 
cases of financial hardship were verified (resulting in Hawaladars not being able 
to dispense or service their financial obligations or commitments), other network 
members come to their rescue (even though the bailout was agreed upon a certain 
set of conditions mostly set by the senior Hawala members). These acts of mutual 
support (sacrifices) propagated trust amongst HNets members and created an 
expectation of helping each other out should the bad times fall on a HNet member. 
Hence reciprocity and dependability kept and reinforced the fabric of HNets.
In cases where the new entrants had no personal ties with the existing 
Hawaladars, references could be secured from trusted and distinguished community 
members. As stated by two interviewees:
Initial introduction can be through a trusted and mutually known 
third party. This third party does not have to be in the Hawala 
business but could be somebody that is equally respected and 
trusted by both parties. The established Hawaladar basically uses 
this reference to start a relationship with the new Hawaladar. The 
introducing party knows that if there are any issues with the new 
Hawaladar then they (the third party) will be held responsible for 
the actions of new Hawaladar. Once the relationship develops 
(between the new and the established Hawaladar) then the 
established Hawaladar is able to provide the new Hawaladar with 
further access to his network. 
(Respondent 6)
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The element of trust is initially based on the personal connections 
and the third part references.  As the Hawaladars business gets 
established, their reputation also gets known and they are then 
able to interact with many more members of the network. 
(Respondent 8)
The importance attached to the personal ties could be explained with 
reference to Granovetter (1973) thesis on the strength of ties. Granovetter (1973, 
p. 1362) notes that "the stronger the ties connecting two individuals, the more 
similar they are, in various ways". This resonated with the way the reference 
system generates information about the trustworthiness of potential Hawaladars. 
Generally, when clean references are provided, they reflect the trust that the referee 
has in the other person with whom they have personal ties.  Given that the referee 
is trusted by the existing member(s) of the network, the network members may 
consider the potential entrant trustworthy on the basis of the trust they have with 
the referee and thus consider him for membership of the network. Granovetter 
(1973, p. 1362) reflects this when he writes: "if strong ties connect A to B and A to 
C, both C and B, being similar to A, are probably similar to one another, increasing 
the likelihood of a friendship once they have met". In a sense, the strength of 
personal ties as reflected in the reference system that underlie the formation and 
composition of HNets is a significant source of trust and constitute a careful "leap 
of faith" for engaging with potential new entrants.
Apart from taking a careful "leap of faith", in most HNets certain checks 
and controls operated to reduce risk (in particular associated with inducting a new 
member). For instance, WH kept a "transaction record" of all members to monitor 
their performance (mostly judged by volume and frequency of monetary amounts 
transacted). In the case of new members the monitoring was more strict and rigid 
transaction limits were set. These checks were relaxed once the trust equity went 
over a certain threshold. In most cases (both for the new and established members) 
the transaction limits were not removed. What usually happened was a change in 
the regularity and thoroughness of the scrutiny. Hawaladars (in particular WH) 
were constantly monitoring the level of risk exposure that may result from the 
actions of other network members. Hence, HNets incorporated risk aversion 
measures as a safety cushion. As stated by Respondent 15:
WH (mostly) knows the worth of Hawaladars in terms of their 
trust status, strength of personal ties and business performance. 
Where appropriate (especially with new and untested Hawaladars), 
WH keeps a tab to ensure that the business transactions are kept 
Khurram Sharif et al.
82
within safe limits. Induction of new Hawaladars can be a complex 
process. There may be some new connections (Hawaladars) that 
do not require any guarantees while there may be some who may 
require either financial or personal or both types of guarantees.
(Respondent 15)
Whereas the reference system was used in generating the trust required to 
become a member of a HNets, it was also important that the potential new entrant 
was able to demonstrate strong ties with and within the community it sought to 
operate in. Strong community relations were important as they formed the basis 
for being able to attract customers (clientele) to the network. Strong community 
relations were an indication of the trustworthiness of the potential new entrant and 
also served as an indication of the customer base that the potential member was 
likely to build. Such relational ties acted not only as guarantees for trustworthiness 
but also served as security (or soft collateral) for participation in the network. This 
was partly because strong personal and family ties made the Hawala member more 
visible and subject to community sanctions when he/she violated the norms of 
expected behaviour. Community ties thus served as an important means of reducing 
potential knowledge asymmetry that existed. Speaking about the importance of 
community ties in the composition of HNets, some of the respondents noted:
One of the most important qualifications for someone to start 
the Hawala business is to be a sociable person, to have extensive 
contacts in the community, should have had a track record 
of being involved with the community which will serve as his 
customer base. An elementary qualification is that he should be a 
trust worthy individual in the eyes of the community/customers. 
(Respondent 13)
One has to have a link to the community that the Hawaladar wants 
to service, i.e. he has to have the customer base and this is possible 
if the person is a sociable person and has connections within 
the local community. The community could be the Pakistani or 
Indian or Bangladeshi community or a subset thereof.  The person 
should also have some connections back home in order to be able 
to terminate the Hawala transactions in the country where the 
remittance will be sent.
(Respondent 8)
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In emphasising the importance of community relations to both the security 
of customers and other HNets participants, the respondents explained that effective 
community engagement was constitutive of the number of years one lived in a 
community, the level of trust and reputation with which one was associated in the 
community, and clean community references. On this, Respondent 4 narrated:
One of the important qualifications for getting involved in the 
Hawala business is the level of engagement of the person with the 
local community (by community we mean their ethnic community).  
Number of years the aspirant has lived in that community and 
the level of trust that that person enjoys. These qualifications are 
important not only from the point of view of the customers who 
would be transacting their business through the Hawaladar but 
also from the point of view of the other Hawaladars that this new 
Hawaladar will be doing business with.  It is important that people 
both within and external to the community will be able to get good 
and clean references about this person from the people of the local 
community. 
(Respondent 4)
Even though not explicitly outlined, indirect references were made to 
the existence of noble value which further facilitated the ease of doing Hawala 
business. In the eyes of the Hawala service users and service providers a powerful 
value (i.e. noble value) resulted from the mixing of various other social values (to 
include clan and religious congruency, honour within the clan, social and moral 
norms and reputation within the clan). Noble value was fundamental in instilling 
trust within the Hawala system (Tilly, 2005). In addition, Nobel value was not only 
related to risk reduction but was also viewed as a master value which reinforced 
service user's belief in the credibility of the Hawala system (Humphrey & Schmitz, 
1996; Grief, 1994).
Within HNets, the relationship orientation was mostly upstream, from 
supplier (Hawaladar) to customer (a person who wanted to send the money). 
However, the downstream relationships (customer to supplier) could not be 
ignored by the Hawaladar as they played a vital role in spreading his trust status and 
reputation within the community. Customers (i.e. Hawala service users) become 
carriers of trust and Word-of-Mouth (WoM) becomes instrumental in building 
'trust equity' of a Hawaladar. Hawala communities (containing Hawaladars and 
their clientele) were mostly tightly knit and extensions of personal ties. Such an 
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environment resulted in a rapid spread of WoM which was considered as a useful 
'qualifier' of a Hawaladar. Respondent 7 summed this up by saying:
Once the community (predominantly the group of customers 
receiving Hawala service) is happy with their transactions not only 
do they become regular customers but also (and more importantly) 
they relate their positive experiences to the community at large 
including the prospective new clients". Some Hawala Networks 
are run from a 'cover business' (some examples of such cover 
businesses can be barber shops, coffee shops, travel agents 
and grocery shops). The cover business acts as a point where 
community members can access the Hawala Network. Cover 
businesses also act as social platforms for developing community 
relations and getting to know each other.
(Respondent 7)
The interview data also indicated that the controls were also embedded 
in the material arrangement (i.e., the pattern of connection established among and 
between network member) of HNets. Basically, the data showed that HNets were 
composed of clans nested within a wider network. Typically, HNets comprised 
Retail Hawaladars (RH) and Wholesale Hawaladars (WH). Within a geographical 
location or a community, a clan of RHs was built around a major WH. The WHs 
were large and well-resourced Hawaladars who were capable of dealing with large 
volumes of transactions involving significant amounts of money. They were also 
highly reputable within their communities and beyond and had global business 
ties. Given the significance of the WHs, minor players who constituted themselves 
into RHs generally congregated around the WHs who acted as a spokesperson for 
the RHs or served as a conduit through which the RHs may gain global reach.
The clans that form around a WH were a socially homogenous community 
with similar family relations, language and ethnicity. They were also generally 
isolated and exclusive from the mainstream society. As a result of this, the clans 
were able to rely on what could be described as mechanical solidarity to produce 
and reinforce trust as an informal control mechanism (Newton, 1997). Mechanical 
solidarity is solidarity that is based on kinship ties and is usually associated with 
the cohesion and integration that exists in small undifferentiated social collective. 
This type of solidarity aligns individual interest with the collective interest of their 
groups without the mediation of elaborate or extensive formal controls associated 
with contemporary organisational forms. This was particularly evident in the data as 
the respondents indicated that in their everyday interaction with other members of 
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the clan, they believed that their ability to achieve their individual self-interest was 
based on the pursuit of collective interests. In essence, self-interest was subsumed 
under collective interests where individuals believed that collective interest was an 
obligatory passage point to self-interest. For example, when asked about what held 
the clan together, some interviewees had this to say:
Basically trust and the fact that each member's economic survival 
and prosperity depends on ensuring transaction compliance, 
delivery and successful termination of the Hawala transaction. 
(Respondent 2)
Financial incentives are solely based on mutual co-existence and 
trust among the members. 
(Respondent 3)
Common purpose and the fact that they can only operate and make 
money only if they work with one another. 
(Respondent 6)
The idea that collective interest is an obligatory passage point to self-
interest generates what Newton (1997) describes as "thick trust" that transforms 
Hawaladars from self-interest seeking into cooperative individuals with significant 
implications for HNets. First, it fosters loyalty among the members and by so 
doing eliminates the transaction cost associated with elaborate contracting and 
monitoring. These reductions in transaction cost means that HNets are able to 
conduct money transfers at a much lower cost compared to the formal banking 
system. Second, the "thick trust" generated within the clan eliminates the need for 
laborious processes of verification and approvals associated with the bureaucracy 
evident in the formal banking system as each member trusts that others will do 
the right thing. It is this that underlies the high speed with which HNets are able 
to transfer money globally compared to their counterparts in the formal banking 
system. Third, reinforcing existing trust involves implicit social sanctions for 
violation and this has led to fewer disputes among Hawaladars and more compliance 
with terms of transactions.
Within HNets thick trust is seen within a long-term orientation where 
short-term losses are mostly accepted in sight of the long-term gains. Numerous 
instances were reported by Hawaladars where due to unavoidable events (such as 
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robberies) and uncertain events (such as sudden and unexpected exchange rate 
changes), the Hawaladar had no option but to face (and accept) the monetary loss. 
Still the general thinking was that the losses incurred were worth the increase in 
trust status and reputation enhancement resulting from acting in an honest manner 
and keeping the promises and the given word. As summed up by respondent 4:
I know Hawaladars (including myself) who took loans or 
liquidated their assets to honor their financial commitments. 
Some Hawaladars suffered financial set-back due to the exchange 
rate going wrong. Still they (Hawaladars) kept their word and 
transacted at the agreed conditions even if this meant losing 
money. This is done to maintain the confidence and the trust of 
the customer. 
(Respondent 4)
Table 3 (matrix of data and theoretical anchors) below summarises the 
empirical data in terms of the theoretical anchors used in the study.
Table 3
Matrix of data and theoretical anchors
Theoretical  
concepts
Ouchi's Clan-based framework
Reciprocity Legitimate Authority Common values  and beliefs
A
ct
or
 N
et
w
or
k 
Th
eo
ry
Heterogeneous 
engineering
Reference system No legal contract
Absence of formal 
organizational structure
Development of 
initial trust
Ability to attract 
cleintele
Reduced risk 
exposure
Strength of 
ties
Loyalty High interdependence Leap of faith
Mechanical solidarity Safety nets Reduced possibility 
of opportunism
Lower cost of exchange Thick trust
Flat networks Pursuit of collective 
interest
No formal control Information sharing
Mutual support Lower transaction cost Risk management
Absence of formal 
monitoring and audit
Speed of transactions
Reduced instance of fraud
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RESULTS
The data indicated that there was no formal governance and management control 
system in place for managing HNets. There were no explicit formal processes and 
mechanisms for evaluating performance and there were no formal performance 
measurement and tracking systems in place to provide information about how the 
network was functioning. Hence, there was seldom a uniform or a standardised 
control system that existed across different HNets. There were controls and 
management practices in place which varied from network to network. This 
variation (resulting in flexibility and adaptability) gave way to cost savings and 
transactional efficiency.
Results from this study showed that trust acted as the most important control 
mechanism highlighting the efficiency, effectiveness and the relatively lower 
transaction costs associated with HNets operations. Furthermore, trust was the 
relational glue which held the network together and acted as an effective cohesive 
force. By using a flat network structure, the HNets were able to reduce the cost of 
the traditional bureaucracy present in the formal banking system. One of the key 
reasons for the reduced cost was the lack of any third party monitoring cost. In the 
regular remittance system there are many layers of checks and balances in order 
to ensure that the transaction is well recorded. All of these layers of management 
with a formal financial institution (such as a central bank) incur costs which have 
to be borne by the service user. A Hawala transaction on the other hand does not 
rely on any third party monitoring as Hawaladars only deal with one another. This 
reduces the cost facilitating a lower rate for carrying out the transaction. This flat 
network structure also added to the efficiency and speed with which decisions were 
made and transactions completed. In addition, trust was the platform on which 
open communication for confidential and sensitive information sharing was built.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study should help in understanding the management control and 
governance mechanisms of the HNets. This understanding could be significant 
for management accounting and organisational researchers as the clan form of 
organisation has been considered more of a metaphor than a practice. However, 
as organisations become more intertwined and independent at the same time; 
understanding how this clan-based structure is governed, managed and controlled 
could provide a unique perspective on alliance management. The results should 
be useful for various practice oriented stakeholders including, regulators, law 
enforcement agencies, formal value transfer systems, financial institutions as well 
as the HNets members.
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Since 2001 Qatari government through their regulatory and law 
enforcement agencies have been actively trying to curb the use of HNets with 
slow and limited success (The Peninsula, 2008). The continued growth of these 
informal remittance systems in the GCC region (including Qatar) indicated the 
lack of impact the enhanced regulations have had on Hawala transaction volume. 
Existing research provides only limited information concerning the governance, 
control structures and mechanisms of HNets. Hence, approaches to regulation up 
till now can be best described as "shots in the dark" and unlikely to be successful. 
Understanding the current governance and control systems of these networks may 
well aid in understanding the nature and endurance of HNets. This research might 
also be useful in identifying alternate or additional mechanisms to curb the use of 
such networks should this be deemed a relevant public policy goal.
Developed research model could be tested in different environments 
(i.e. in a different set of countries or a region). For instance, the study could be 
rolled out to Western European and North American regions to assess and identify 
differences and similarities that exist between different cultural, social, ethnic and 
regulatory settings. These results should allow for a better understanding of this 
global network and examination of regulatory strategies, monitoring structures 
and mechanisms that may be developed and tested. It would be imprudent to 
declare HNets illegal. Instead, mechanisms and policies need to be developed 
that would incorporate the HNets self-monitoring features and ensure the system's 
safe and judicious use. Also, there is a growing need to estimate the global size 
of HNets transactions, the number of transactions, average size of each transfer 
and the aggregate flow of currency. Furthermore, the changing world economic 
environment has impacted the HNets as well. These need to be understood to make 
future monitoring policies effective.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This report was made possible by a NPRP award (NPRP4-234-5-039) from the 
Qatar National Research Fund (a member of The Qatar Foundation). The statements 
made herein are solely the responsibility of the authors.
REFERENCES
Arthur, S., & Nazroo, J. (2003). Designing fieldwork strategies and materials. In J. Ritchie, 
& J. H. Lewis (Eds.). Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science 
students and Rresearchers (109–137). London: Sage.
Hawala Networks in the GCC Region 
89
Ballard, R. (2003). A background report on the operation of informal value transfer systems 
(Hawala). Retrieved 30 April 2003 from  http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/
pages/presentations.htm 
Ballard, R. (2005a). Coalitions of reciprocity and the maintenance of financial integrity 
within informal value transmission systems: The operational dynamics of 
contemporary Hawala networks. Journal of Banking Regulation, 6(4), 319–352. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jbr.2340200
Ballard, R. (2005b). Remittances and economic development in India and Pakistan. In 
S. Maimbo, & D. Ratha (Eds.), Remittances: Development Impact and Future 
Prospects (pp. 103–118). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Berti, B. (2008). The economics of counterterrorism: Devising a normative regulatory 
framework for the hawala system. MIT INternational Review (Spring), 15–21.
Briers, M., & Chua, W. F. (2001). The role of actor-networks and boundry objects 
in management accounting change: A field study of an implimentation of 
activity-based costing. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26(3), 237–269. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(00)00029-5
Browne, K. (2005). Snowball sampling: Using social networks to reach non-heterosexual 
women. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 8(1), 47-60. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1364557032000081663
Caliskan, K., & Callon, M. (2009). Economization, part 1: Shifting attention from the 
economy towards processes of economization. Economy and Society, 38(3), 
369–398. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140903020580
Callon, M. (1998). An essay on framing and overflowing: Economic externalities revisited 
by sociology. In M. Callon (Ed.). The laws of the markets (pp. 244–269). Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.1998.tb03477.x
Callon, M. (1999). Actor-network theory: The market test. In J. Law, & J. Hassard (Eds.). 
Actor network theory and after (pp. 181–195). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Callon, M. (1991). Techno-economic networks and irreversability. In J. Law (Ed.). A 
sociology of monsters: Essays on power, technology and dominations (pp. 132–
161). London: Routledge.
Callon, M., Law, J., & Rip, A. (1986). How to study the force of science. In M. Callon, 
J. Law, & A. Rip (Eds.), Mapping the dynamics of science and technology: 
Sociology of science in the real world (pp. 3–15). Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07408-2_1
Chene, M. (2008). Hawala remittance system and money laundering, U4 expert answer, 
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Retrieved 17 April 2009 from  http://www.
u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=170
Chua, W. (1995). Experts, networks and inscriptions in the fabrication of accounting images: 
A story of representation of three public hospitals. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 20(2–3), 111–145. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(95)95744-H
Chua, W. F., & Mahama, H. (2007). The effect of network ties on accounting controls 
in a supply alliance: Field study evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
24(1), 47–86. https://doi.org/10.1506/7156-201W-1290-83H4
El-Qorchi, M. (2002). Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work and 
should it be regulated? Finance and Development of the World Bank, 39(4), 
31–33.
Khurram Sharif et al.
90
El-Qorchi, M. Maimbo, S. M., & Wilson, J. F. (2003). Informal fund transfer systems: An 
analysis of the Hawala system. IMF Occasional Paper No. 222. Washington, DC: 
The International Monetary. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589062269.084
Farooqi, M. N. (2010). Curbing the use of Hawala for money laundering and terrorist 
financing: Global regulatory response and future challenges. International Journal 
of Business Governance and Ethics, 5(1/2), 64–75. https://doi.org/10.1504/
IJBGE.2010.029556
Ferreira, L. D., & Merchant, K. A. (1992). Field research in management accounting 
and control: A review and evaluation. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 5(4), 3–34. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513579210019503
Gendron, Y., & Barrett, M. (2004). Professionalization in action: Accountants' attempt at 
building a network of support for the WebTrust seal of assurance. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 31(3), 563–601. https://doi.org/10.1506/H1C0-EU27-
UU2K-8EC8
Gouldner, A. W. (1961). The norm of reciprocity. American Sociological Review, 25, 
161–179. https://doi.org/10.2307/2092623
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
78(6), 1360–1380. https://doi.org/10.1086/225469
Grief, A. (1994). Cultural beliefs and the organisation of society: A historical and theoretical 
reflections on collectivist and individualist societies, The Journal of Political 
Economy, 102(5), 912–950. https://doi.org/10.1086/261959
Hanieh, A. (2010). Temporary migrant labour and the spatial structuring of class in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. Journal of Global Studies, 1(3), 112–126. 
Holstein, J. A., & Gubrium, J. F. (2004). The active interview. In D. Silverman (Ed.). 
Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice (p. 141).Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Humphrey, J., & Schmitz, H. (1996). Trust and economic development, University of 
Sussex Discussion paper No. 355. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, 10–11. 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Latour, B. (1996). Aramis, or the love of technology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Law, J. (1991). Introduction: Monsters, machines and sociotechnical relations. In Sociology 
of monsters: Essays on power, technology and domination (pp. 1–23). New York: 
Routledge.
Maimbo, S. (2003). The money exchange dealers of Kabul. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-5586-4
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Miller, P. (1991). Accounting innovation and beyond the enterprise: Problematizing 
investment decisions and programming economic growth in the UK in the 
1960s. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16(8), 733–762. https://doi.
org/10.1016/0361-3682(91)90022-7
Hawala Networks in the GCC Region 
91
Newton, K. (1997). Social capital and democracy. American Behavioural Scientist, 40(5), 
575–586.
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies and clans. Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 
25(1), 129–141. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392231
Passas, N. (1999). Informal value transfer systems and criminal organizations: A study 
into so-called underground banking networks. Retrieved 1 May 2003 from  http://
www.minjust.nl:8080/b_organ/wodcpublications/ivts.pdf 
Passas, N. (2006). Fighting terror with terror: The counter-productive regulation of informal 
value transfers. Crime Law and Social Change, 45(4–5), 315–336. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10611-006-9041-5
Pathak, R. (2003). The obstacles to regulating the Hawala: A cultural norm or a terrorist 
hotbed? Fordham International Law Journal, 17(6), 2055–2061. Retrieved 12 
June 2011 from http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.). Newbury 
Park: Sage Publications.
Preston, A. M., Cooper, D. J., & Coombs, R. W. (1992). Fabricating budgets: A study of the 
production of management budgeting in the national health service. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 17(6), 561–593. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-
3682(92)90014-J
Robson, K. (1992). Accounting numbers as "inscription": Action at a distance and the 
development of accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17(7), 685–
708. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(92)90019-O
Schramm, M., & Taube, M. (2002). The institutional foundations of Al Qaida's global 
financial system. Retrieved 2 May 2003 from  http://www.uniduisburg.de/
Institute/OAWISS/download/doc/institutsbericht8.pdf 
Schramm, M., & Taube, M. (2003). Evolution and institutional foundation of the Hawala 
financial system. International Review of Financial Analysis, 12, 405–420. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-5219(03)00032-2
Sudman, S. (1976). Applied sampling. New York: Academic Press. 
Taylor, L. (1985). In the underworld. London: Unwin.
The Peninsula. (2008). Qatar leads in battle agianst black money, 21 May 2008.
Thompson, E. A. (2011). Trust is the coin of the realm: Lessons from the money men in 
Afghanistan. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press.
Tilly, C. (2005). Trust and rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9780511618185
White, G. (2003). Towards a political analysis of markets. Institute of Development Studies 
Bulletin, 24(3), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1993.mp24003001.x
Wilson, J. (2002). Hawala and other informal payment systems: An economic perspective. 
Retrieved 30 April 2003 from  http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/
cdmfl/eng/wilson.pdf 
Yin, R. (1989). Case study research: Design and methods (rev. ed.). Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications.
Khurram Sharif et al.
92
APPENDIX
Research Questionnaire
 
Respondent:   
Venue: 
Date:  
Profile:
# Questions
Network membership
1 How does one become a Hawaladar (Hawala dealer)? What are the "Terms 
of Membership" of this clan-based organization?
2 How does the Hawaladar find or identify the links to other Hawaladars? 
(across town, across countries and borders). Is it through an introduction? 
Personal meeting etc.?
3 How does a Hawaladar move from a retail operation to being a bigger 
player in the network?
4 How has the ethnic/religious-based relationship morphed into a multinational 
clan-based setup?
5 What binds the Hawala network members together?
6 Are there any new constructs, which are homogenous among the network 
members (other than culture and ethnicity)?
Network Trust
7 How is the element of trust established between the Hawaladars and the 
network?  
8 Are there any guarantees (personal or financial) involved?
9 Are there any collateral or guarantee arrangements between the Retail 
Hawaladar (RH) and Wholesale Hawaladar (WH) operators?
Network Relationships
10 Do RH have relationships with WH in their country of location? Or do 
they also have direct relationships with WH in other countries?  If so, how 
does the settlement take place? Is the settlement directly between the Retail 
Hawaladar (RH) and Wholesale Hawaladar (WH) operator or are there 
third parties involved?
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11 Is the relationship between a RH and WH exclusive or does the RH have 
relationships with other WH also?
12 What are the factors, which make this otherwise heterogeneous group to 
form a clan?
 Network Management
13 What is the standard information exchanged for the Hawala transaction 
(name, amount etc. type)?
14 How is the transaction information communicated?
15 Who is authorized to transmit transaction details to the WH?
16 How does the WH identify the person sending the transaction details and 
verify the legitimacy of the transaction?
17 What kind of transaction authentication takes place between the RH and 
WH?
18 Do WH place limits on the volume of transactions they will carry out for 
any individual RH?  If yes, how are these limits monitored (spreadsheet, 
daily- running totals etc.)?
19 What types of internal documents are maintained by the Hawaladar to 
monitor financial position of the business?
20 What kind of management structure do the Hawala operations have?  Are 
they mostly sole proprietorships, partnerships or corporations?
21 Is the business carried out as an exclusive Hawala business or as an adjunct 
to another line of business?  And why?
22 How does the network ensure transaction compliance among its members?
23 How are discrepancies among members resolved?
24 How are customer complaints handled?
25 What mechanisms are in place to identify and sideline members who are 
found cheating?
 Network Compliance
26 What other forms of compliance does the network use?
